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MUNICIPAL REGULATION OF HOUSE TRAILERS IN
PENNSYLVANIA
BY W. RICHARD ESHELMAN*
The modern house trailer, more appropriately known as a mobile-
home, is a large, compact, completely equipped apartment on wheels. It
includes sleeping, cooking, washing and sanitation facilities. It is a unit
independent of outside facilities except for water, gas and electric supply,
and sewage disposal. The mobilehome is 10 or 12 feet wide, usually 50 or
55 feet in length, and can be moved only by special equipment.
The forerunner of the mobilehome is the small house trailer or travel
coach of the 1930's. It was designed for tourists, campers and vacationists.
Seldom over 25 feet long and not over 8 feet wide, it contains sleeping and
cooking facilities, but is usually dependent upon outside washing and sanitary
facilities, as well as water, gas and electric supply. It was used extensively
for temporary housing during and immediately following World War II, and
is still used by some persons for housing, particularly by transients.
According to the November 1961 issue of Horizons,' during the past two
years one in every ten new housing starts was a mobilehome. More than
three million people in the United States live in mobilehomes, of which
about 200,000 reside in Pennsylvania, and during the past two years only
California exceeded Pennsylvania in the number of units sold. The typical
mobilehome will be located in a trailer park, will stay in. the same spot for
two and one-half years, and will be permanently occupied.
During the War, trailer parks sprang up like mushrooms around military
installations and defense plants to provide temporary housing. Today trailer
parks are in general use as a site for house trailers, whether for a temporary
or an indefinite stay. These parks usually provide, at the minimum, a park-
ing site for the house trailer and connection facilities for water, electricity,
and sewage disposal, and sometimes separate buildings containing washing
and sanitary facilities. However, crowded conditions, inadequate facilities,
untidiness and disorder of trailer parks and individual house trailers have
created many problems for the municipalities in which trailer parks are
located. Sometimes some of these same problems exist with respect to single
house trailers located on individual lots. The usual inspection by local build-
ing, electrical and plumbing inspectors cannot be made with respect to house
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trailers, which are manufactured and assembled prior to placement on the
site, and difficulties of enforcement of municipal regulations are ever present.
Residents usually oppose the placing of a house trailer on an individual lot
in the neighborhood, and also object to the operation of a trailer park in the
immediate area. As a result, many local jurisdictions have virtually pro-
hibited the use of house trailers by enacting building codes so drafted that
a house trailer cannot meet the requirements for dwellings.
Whether we like it or not, house trailers are here to stay. The question
is not whether the house trailers belong, but where they belong. From an
appearance standpoint, a house trailer does not resemble a conventional,
single-family residence. From a municipal administration standpoint, a
house trailer is a preassembled, compact unit not permanently affixed to the
land, remaining in one location usually no more than a few years. Con-
sequently, it is probably better to have mobilehomes located in well planned
and supervised parks, or at least restricted to designated areas subject to
close municipal regulation, rather than scattered throughout the community
on individual lots. The problem is to accomplish such a result within the
limitations of the law to the satisfaction of all concerned.
POWER TO REGULATE
The power to regulate house trailers and trailer parks is derived from
the police power of the state as delegated to the municipality through ena-
bling legislation. It is therefore necessary to look to the respective state-
enacted municipal codes to determine the limits within which a given
municipality may exercise the police power, for the municipality, as a state
agency, possesses no inherent powers. This initial limitation confines the
municipality to the exercise only of those powers expressly granted, or
necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to those expressly granted in
the appropriate municipal code.
2
A further limitation is that both state enabling acts and municipal
ordinances purporting to exercise the police power must bear a reasonable
relation to the promotion of the public health, safety, morals or general wel-
fare, and must not be arbitrary or discriminatory. In addition, such legis-
lation may not deny equal protection of the laws, abridge the privileges or
immunities of the citizens of the several states, deprive any person of life,
liberty or property without due process of law, or violate any of the funda-
mental rights which are safeguarded by the respective state constitutions and
the Constitution of the United States.
8
2. See Lesley v. Kite, 192 Pa. 268, 43 Atl. 959 (1899).
3. In affirming a decree holding unconstitutional an ordinance of Pittsburgh pro-
viding for certain building set-back lines on lots, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in
White's Appeal, 287 Pa. 259, 134 Atl. 409 (1926), stated:
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Municipal regulation of trailers and trailer parks, then, is sanctioned and
conditioned by state grant of power, and further limited by prohibitions of
the Federal and State Constitutions. Furthermore, this state-delegated
power is not exclusive. A state, by delegating regulatory authority to a
municipality, does not necessarily preclude itself from exercising concurrent
power. Conversely, a state regulatory statute does not necessarily pre-




The dualistic nature of the mobilehome (sometimes mobile, sometimes
a home) has led to its subjection to dual forms of regulation, depending
upon its status, transient or semi-permanent, at a given time.
The Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code5 defines "House Trailer" as
"Every trailer, designed and used exclusively for living quarters, which does
not exceed the maximum size and weights prescribed under the laws of
this Commonwealth," and defines "Trailer" as "Every vehicle without
motive power, designed to carry property or passengers or designed and
used exclusively for living quarters wholly on its own structure, and to be
drawn by a motor vehicle or tractor .... -6
The Motor Vehicle Code clearly applies to house trailers, primarily
from the standpoint of their use as vehicles on the highways. The code
imposes various requirements concerning equipment, including coupling
devices, caution signals, and fire extinguishers, as well as size limitations
and special hauling permits. Except for house trailer manufacturers and
dealers, the code provides that a certificate of title shall be obtained for
each house trailer, with notation thereon of any encumbrance, and that a




House trailers are primarily places for human habitation. As such they
are necessarily and properly subject to municipal regulation in the exercise
Under the 14th Amendment, property cannot be taken except by due process
of law. Regulation under a proper exercise of the police power is due process,
even though a property in whole or in part is taken or destroyed .... There
should be a reasonable and substantial relation between the thing acted on
and the end to be obtained, one that promotes health, safety, or general wel-
fare. . . . The power of judicial investigation . .. is concerned only with
the questions of whether the statute has a recognized police purpose, and
whether it has a reasonable relation to the object to be attained.
Supra at 264, 265, 134 Atl. at 411. See Medinger Appeal, 377 Pa. 217, 104 A.2d 118
(1954).
4. Department of Licenses & Inspections v. Weber, 394 Pa. 466, 147 A.2d 326 (1959).
5. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 75 (1960).
6. Id. § 102.
7. Id. §§ 201, 202, 401.
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of the police power. This exercise may take the form of building control,
size requirements, and use zoning.
The first appellate court case in Pennsylvania upholding the application
of building code requirements to a house trailer is Lower Merion Township
v. Gallup.8 In this case a first class township enacted a building code fixing
certain minimum requirements relating to light, air, sanitation and safety of
buildings thereafter erected, and imposing penalties for those who built, used,
or permitted to be used any nonconforming buildings, including dwellings.
The code provided: "House trailer means any vehicle used for living or
sleeping purposes. If a house trailer is used for living or sleeping purposes
within the Township for an aggregate of more than thirty days in any period
of one year, it shall be considered as a single-family dwelling for all purposes
of this ordinance."9 The defendant permitted house trailers to be placed on
his ground and to be used and occupied as dwellings, which trailers did not
conform to the code requirements in a great number of respects, including
sanitation and windows. This subjected defendant to a penalty, from which
he appealed, attacking the validity of the ordinance. In upholding the power
of the municipality, under the First Class Township Code of 1931,10 to im-
pose such building regulations, the court stated: "A house trailer is simply
a mobile house. It is as much a dwelling as any house which is built on a
foundation and therefore not mobile."'" With reference to the building code
provision that a trailer is not to be considered a dwelling until it has remained
thirty days, the court concluded:
This is a fair standard by which to determine whether the use is
temporary and transient, and therefore legal, or settled and fixed,i
and therefore illegal. If the local government cannot fix a thirty
day limit it can as well be argued that no limit can be fixed, which
in turn means that permanency cannot be avoided.
12
A few years later Commonwealth v. McLaughlin13 was decided. In this
case the defendants appealed from summary convictions for violations of a
first class township building ordinance, requiring that all dwellings have a
minimum of 384 square feet of space onl the first floor, and including house
trailers within the definition of single-family dwellings, if used for living
purposes more than 30 days in a year. Defendants' house trailers so qualified
as dwellings, and they admittedly did not possess the minimum floor area
8. 158 Pa. Super. 572, 46 A.2d 35 (1946).
9. Id. at 574, 46 A.2d at 36.
10. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 53, §§ 55101-58502 (1957), as amended, Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 53, §§ 55251-58107 (Supp. 1960).
11. Supra note 8, at 575, 46 A.2d at 36.
12. Ibid.
13. 168 Pa. Super. 442, 78 A.2d 880 (1951).
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required. The court affirmed the judgments, citing the Gallup case and
stating:
In the Gallup case it was impossible for house trailers to conform
to the building ordinance but the legislation was sustained ...
We cannot say that the exercise of the police power in this ordi-
nance is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory, nor
that the actions of the officers were patently unreasonable or
oppressive.'
4
In the Gallup and McLaughlin decisions, the courts conceded that
house trailers could not comply with the building code requirements. The
question has been raised whether less stringent building requirements might
be applied to house trailers, such as permitting smaller rooms, lesser ceiling
heights or window areas, and different structural requirements than those
applicable to permanent dwelling houses constructed on the site. It is
believed that such a distinction could be challenged as being discriminatory
and therefore unconstitutional in that all dwellings would not be treated
alike. In the case of In re Falls Township Trailer Ordinance (No. 2),15
wherein certain regulations of a second class township ordinance applicable
only to trailer parks were held invalid, the court, referring to Section 702,
Clause LI, of the Second Class Township Code16 authorizing building and
sanitation regulations, stated:
A house trailer is undoubtedly a dwelling and hence subject to a
generally applicable building code . . . [citing Gallup and McLaugh-
lin]. [N]evertheless, this legislation is no authority for singling
out merely one type of abode since it authorizes only the regulation
of all dwellings within the township. Particularly is this true since
no authority is conferred even to classify particular types of uses
in this statutory provision. Compare Lower Merion Township v.
Harrison, 84 Pa. Superior Ct. 574. (Court's emphasis.)'
7
Although the result was probably correct, the court in its opinion overlooked
Section 702, Clause L, of the Second Class Township Code' authorizing
building regulations, including the power to classify buildings or parts of
buildings according to the use to be made of them. An identical clause con-
tained in the First Class Township Code 19 was referred to by the supreme
court in the Gallup case as the authority for Lower Merion Township to
classify buildings (including trailers) according to use. The above-mentioned
clause was added to both First and Second Class Township Codes following
14. Id. at 445, 446, 78 A.2d at 881, 882.
15. 89 D.&C. 203 (Pa. 1954).
16. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 53, § 65751 (1957).
17. Supra note 15, at 207.
18. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 53, § 65750 (1957).
19. Id. § 56518.
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the Lower Merion Township case cited above in the quotation from the Falls
Township opinion. Therefore, the better reason for the Falls Township deci-
sion would have been that, even if classification of buildings for uses is
authorized, different building regulations cannot be applied to house trailers
on the one hand and to permanent dwelling houses constructed on the site
on the other, unless the difference can be justified as necessary for
the preservation of the public health, safety, morals or general welfare. This
was clearly brought out in Medinger Appeal,20 a case involving a zoning
ordinance which divided a first class township into various districts and
prescribed different requirements as to minimum habitable floor area in each
district. The court held that the ordinance could not be sustained as con-
ducive to the health, morals, safety or general welfare of the community, and
stated:
It does not follow that a minimum scale of habitable floor space
in a home may not have a reasonable, direct and proper relation to
the health and morals, and possibly, to the safety of the occupants
of the house or of the community in general, because it is well
known that an overcrowding of persons or of members of a large
family in a tiny house or in a small room or rooms might un-
doubtedly have a direct effect on their health and morals. But if a
1000-minimum habitable square feet is reasonable and proper for
every home in one district and does not adversely affect the health,
morals or safety of the occupants of such a house, 1125 square feet
of habitable floor area in a nearby house [in a district with an 1800
square feet minimum floor area] cannot adversely affect the health,
morals or safety of that home or of that community.
21
The principle of uniformity was also the deciding factor in the case
of Crawford v. Wesleyville,22 involving a borough ordinance which imposed
a license fee upon landowners and tenants of land for the privilege of
keeping or permitting on their property inhabited trailers. The court held
that the ordinance was invalid insofar as it applied to a landowner occupying
a trailer on his own property in that it discriminated against him by impos-
ing a burden which was not imposed upon those who owned their own land
and lived thereon in a more permanent type of abode.23 However, the court
20. Supra note 3.
21. Id. at 225, 104 A.2d at 122.
22. 68 D.&C. 215 (Pa. 1949).
23. The court stated:
Furthermore, by viewing a trailer as a house it can be seen that this ordinance
violates the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution by de-
priving one class of citizens of the equal protection of the laws. A municipality
is powerless to discriminate between citizens similarly situated: Sayre Borough
v. Phillips, 148 Pa. 482 [24 Atl. 76 (1892)]. Any discrimination, if not based
upon reasonable and just classification, is a denial of equal protection and is
unconstitutional.
Supra note 22, at 220.
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held the ordinance to be valid as a police measure applicable to those who
operated trailer camps for profit, because such camps create increased hazards
to the health, safety and morals of the community and hence require more
borough services.
Some municipalities have attempted outright prohibition of house trail-
ers, but without success. In the case of Commonwealth v. Amos, 24 a first
class township ordinance prohibited the parking or locating of any trailer
which could be used for living quarters on any lot, property, or street within
the limits of the township. The court held the ordinance to be invalid in
that it did not attempt to regulate trailers and trailer camps but arbitrarily
prohibited the parking or locating of a trailer anywhere in the township. In
the case of In re Falls Township Trailer Ordinance,25 a second class town-
ship ordinance proscribing the placing, storing or parking of trailers upon
any private or public land in the township was held to be invalid as outside
the township's delegated authority. Conceding that a trailer or trailer park
might, under particular circumstances, constitute a nuisance in fact, the
court stressed that such a possibility would provide no warrant for outlawing
them entirely, and concluded:
[A]Ithough the Falls Township Supervisors undoubtedly have
power to adopt building regulations or zoning ordinances in the
manner provided by law, which might regulate house trailers as
part of the general scheme thereof, nevertheless they have no author-
ity to single out trailers and flatly to prohibit them within the town-
ship.2
6
In summary, it therefore appears to be established that house trailers
are subject to municipal regulation as dwellings under the police power. A
distinction may be made between the temporary, transient use and the
settled, fixed use of a house trailer. The Pennsylvania cases hold that the
same building regulations must be uniformly applied to house trailers of a
settled or fixed use and other dwellings of a permanent nature even though
it may be impossible for any house trailers to comply with such regulations.
Thus, the use of trailers as dwellings in a municipality may be effectively
prohibited altogether by a uniform ordinance, even though regulations pro-
viding for outright prohibition of house trailers are invalid because dis-
criminatory. However, in the light of the language of some of the sections
of the municipal codes empowering municipalities to enact building regu-
lations and to classify buildings according to use, it would seem that different
24. 44 D.&C. 125 (Pa. 1941).
25. 84 D.&C. 199 (Pa. 1952).
26. Id. at 209. See Borough of Mountville v. Miller, 7 D.&C.2d 577 (Pa. 1956),




building regulations might be justified as between house trailers and other
types of permanent dwellings if based on a reasonable classification having
a direct relation to the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the
occupants and of the community in general.
REGULATION OF TRAILER PARKS
A house trailer, including the modern mobilehome, requires the same
utilities as a modern stationary residence, including water, electricity and
telephone connections, and sewage and refuse disposal. The house trailer
owner who stays indefinitely (but seldom permanently) at one location can
best be provided with these necessary accommodations in a trailer park where
water and sewer mains, power lines, and utility connections are adequately
installed and maintained. To purchase real estate and to install the necessary
underground and other desirable improvements for a single house trailer
is usually not economically feasible. Also, most municipalities find it more
convenient to enforce regulations if house trailers are gathered at one or
several locations, rather than scattered in single units throughout the
community.
A trailer park or camp is usually defined as a plot of ground upon which
two or more house trailers, occupied for living or sleeping purposes, are
located. Municipal regulations often include requirements that one obtain
a permit before operating such a park, for which permit a fee is paid
initially and thereafter annually. An applicant for a permit may also be
required to submit layout plans and a description of facilities. The normal
regulations governing the operation of trailer parks pertain to space require-
ments for locating house trailers, driveway and parking areas, water and
electricity supply, sewage and refuse disposal, fire precautions, and service
buildings.
Numerous cases in Pennsylvania have upheld the validity of municipal
regulation of trailer parks. In the case of Palumbo Appeal,27 a borough ordi-
nance regulating trailer camps, including the requirements of a permit and
payment of an annual license fee, was upheld along with another generally
applicable sewage disposal ordinance. The court held that there was author-
ity for enactment of the ordinances under the applicable statutes28 authoriz-
ing regulations respecting vaults, cesspools, plumbing, drains, sanitation,
water supply, toilet facilities and drainage. In so holding, the court sug-
gested: "The ordinances do not prohibit the conduct of appellant's business;
they seek only to regulate it. Regulation under authorized exercise of police
27. 166 Pa. Super. 557, 72 A.2d 789 (1950).
28. Pa. Laws 1927, 519 (General Borough Act), and Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 53,
§ 4101 (1957) (authorizing generally enactment of regulations by cities, towns, boroughs,
and townships).
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power is due process even though property or a business is taken or de-
stroyed." 29 This same ordinance was upheld in Cloverleaf T.S. Co. v. Pleasant
Hills Borough5 0 as being applicable to an existing camp as well as to the
establishment of a new camp.
In the case of In re Falls Township Trailer Ordinance (No. 2),'31 the
court held that Falls Township was empowered to enact an ordinance regulating
trailer camps by Section 702, Clause XXIX, of the Second Class Township
Code,3 2 authorizing regulations necessary for promotion of the health, cleanli-
ness, comfort and safety of citizens. However, the court held that the ordi-
nance requirement of a service building containing separate sanitary facilities
in trailer parks accommodating only "independent" trailers having sanitary
conveniences was arbitrary, unreasonable and void as having no reasonable
relationship to the public health or safety, although the same requirement
was considered valid as to parks accommodating "dependent" trailers not
having sanitary conveniences.
3 3
A significant case is Township of Whitehall v. Oswald,34 involving a
first class township ordinance prohibiting occupancy of a trailer coach for
living or sleeping, except in a licensed trailer park. The lower court, in a
declaratory judgment proceeding on petition of the township, upheld the
validity of the ordinance on the ground that there is a direct relationship
between the prohibition against living in an isolated trailer and the public
health and welfare.35 On appeal, the supreme court vacated the judgment
on the ground that the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act 6 does not create
any right in a municipality to test by a declaratory judgment proceeding the
constitutionality of one of its own enactments.3 7 It is unfortunate that this
29. Supra note 27, at 565, 566, 72 A.2d at 793.
30. 366 Pa. 116, 76 A.2d 379 (1950).
31. Supra note 15.
32. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 53, § 65729 (1957).
33. See Commonwealth v. Amos, 44 D.&C. 125 (Pa. 1941), wherein the court,
although holding invalid a first class township ordinance absolutely prohibiting trailers
for living quarters and trailer camps, nevertheless noted: "[A]ny municipal regulation
of trailers and trailer camps which reasonably promotes the health, morals, safety or
general welfare of the community will undoubtedly be sustained." Supra at 128.
34. 50 Pa. Mun. L. Rep. 270 (1958), rev'd sub noin. Whitehall Township v. Oswald,
400 Pa. 65, 161 A.2d 348 (1960).
35. The Court noted that "a township can the more readily police sanitary condi-
tiors if trailer residents are concentrated in camps where the trailers are concentrated
and not scattered, and where one person can be held responsible for the conduct of
many trailers and will be diligent in promoting sanitation at the risk of losing the value
of his permit and livelihood." Id. at 273.
36. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §§ 831-846 (1953).
37. See Dissenting Opinion in Whitehall Township v. Oswald, wherein Justice
Bell, joined by Justice Musmanno, argued that the "unusual and inevitable problems and
hardships" presented in the case justified the declaratory judgment proceeding. He
further stated that, because the ordinance bore "no reasonable and necessary relation
to public health or safety (or even to general welfare)," he considered it clearly un-
constitutional. Supra note 34, at 69, 73, 161 A.2d at 350, 352.
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case came before the supreme court on an appeal from a declaratory judg-
ment, for it would be helpful to know whether the court would sustain an
ordinance requiring that all trailer coaches be located in a licensed trailer
park,8 enacted presumably under the authority of Section 1502, Clause
XLIV, of the First Class Township Code authorizing "such regulations as
may be deemed necessary for the health, safety, morals, general welfare,
cleanliness, beauty, convenience and comfort of the township and the in-
habitants thereof."
8 9
In any event, the Pennsylvania cases indicate that municipalities are
authorized to regulate the operation of trailer parks. Such regulation is an
exercise of the general powers set forth in the various municipal codes and
other statutes dealing with matters such as health and sanitation. Note that
these powers are in addition to the specific powers of municipalities to
impose building regulations and zoning restrictions. Furthermore, the De-
partment of Health of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has adopted, as
of October 30, 1959, and is enforcing "Regulations for Mobilehome Parks.1
40
These regulations are in many respects similar to the municipal regulations
discussed above.
ZONING REGULATIONS
The right of an owner of a house trailer and of an operator of a trailer
park to use his property in his own way and for his own purposes is also
subject to zoning restrictions based upon the police power. Zoning has been
defined as the legislative division of a community into areas, in each of which
only certain designated uses of land are permitted, so that the community
may develop in an orderly manner in accordance with a comprehensive plan.
4 1
The various municipal codes of Pennsylvania empower the respective munici-
palities to enact zoning regulations dividing the municipality into districts
with different regulations applying to each district.
For purposes of zoning, a house trailer has been treated as a single-
family dwelling. In Commonwealth v. Helmuth,42 the conviction of a trailer
camp operator for violation of a township zoning ordinance requiring a
minimum lot area of 2,400 square feet for a one-family dwelling was upheld.
43
38. See note 37, supra.
39. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 53, § 56544 (1957).
40. Rules and Regulations, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Health,
ch. 4, art. 415, Oct. 30, 1959.
41. See Best v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 106, 141 A.2d 606 (1958).
42. 73 D.&C. 370 (Pa. 1949).
43. Rejecting the contention that the defendant had established a non-conforming
use which justified moving new trailers onto undersize lots on which other trailers had
existed at the time of passage of the ordinance, the court stated:
If we were to consider the practice of moving trailer homes on and off at will
as a right existing under previous practice we could not, with justification,
[Vol. 66
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Commonwealth v. Flannery44 held that under the borough zoning ordinance
a house trailer came within the definition of a "single-family detached
dwelling," which was defined as "a detached building designed for or occupied
by one family and having no party wall in common with an adjacent house."
Defendant was therefore permitted to locate his house trailer in a residential
district restricted to single-family detached dwellings, because: "Although
the location of this trailer on a lot in an area where there are only per-
manently constructed homes may not harmonize or be in aesthetic agreement
with the other buildings, the health, morals and safety of the community are
not affected thereby. Its location thereon may not, therefore, be pro-
hibited. '45 In both of the above-mentioned cases the Gallup case46 was cited
as the authority for holding that a house trailer is a dwelling.
Zoning ordinances which exclude house trailers or trailer camps from
the entire municipality have been held invalid. In Shellhamer v. Zoning
Board of Adjustment,47 the court declared portions of a second class town-
ship zoning ordinance prohibiting trailers and trailer camps to be invalid,
noting:
The Appellee has failed to demonstrate that the total exclusion of
trailers and trailer courts-and particularly exclusion in an agri-
cultural district-is in any way related to the preservation of public
health, safety, morals or general welfare and unless one or more of
these factors is present the questioned portions of the Ordinance
must fall.
48
Also, in Hunter v. Richter,49 the court held that under a second class town-
ship zoning ordinance the prohibition of a trailer or tent for use as a place
of residence in any district for a longer period than fourteen days in any
twelve consecutive months was an invalid prohibition, but that fourteen days
in any twelve consecutive months was a proper standard by which to dis-
tinguish between a transient use and a permanent use, the latter being
classified as "dwelling house" within the meaning of the zoning ordinance
and building code of the township. The court also held that the portion of
the zoning ordinance prohibiting trailer camps in any district was invalid.
It does appear, however, that house trailers and trailer camps can be
prohibited, by zoning regulations, from being located in some of the districts
prevent anyone who owns a plot of land within the zoned area from adding
additional dwelling houses ....
Commonwealth v. Helmuth, supra note 42, at 372.
44. 1 D.&C. 2d 680 (Pa. 1954).
45. Id. at 683.
46. Supra note 8.
47. 52 Pa. Mun. L. Rep. 315 (1961).
48. Id. at 319.
49. 9 D.&C. 2d 58 (Pa. 1955).
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in a municipality. The case of Commonwealth v. Stong,50 held that a trailer
or mobilehome was not a single family detached dwelling within the meaning
of the township ordinance which defined a single family dwelling as "[a]
building designed for and occupied exclusively as a dwelling for one family,"
and which defined "building" as "[a]ny structure having enclosing walls
and roof, permanently located on the land." The court held that, although
occupancy of a single family detached dwelling was a permitted use in an
agricultural district, a trailer did not meet the standards of such a per-
mitted dwelling;51 hence, the defendant could not locate his trailer in the
agricultural district, and his conviction for violation of the zoning ordinance
was upheld. The case of Commonwealth, Borough of Bellevue v. Reed 2
presented the question whether a nonconforming use had been established
at the time of enactment of a zoning ordinance specifically prohibiting the
use of land zoned "commercial" for trailer camps or for the occupancy of
trailers as a place of temporary or permanent residence. The court found
that a nonconforming use had not been established, and stated: "This ordi-
nance was an exercise of the police power enacted in the interest of the
public health and the appellant does not question its reasonableness as
applied to the factual situation presented here.15 3 In the case of Vagnoni v.
Board of Adjustment,54 the court upheld the validity of a second class town-
ship zoning ordinance prohibiting the establishment of a trailer camp in an
agricultural district. However, in Hickory Township v. Wooddell,55 a zoning
ordinance restricting mobilehomes to mobilehome parks, which parks were
permitted in all residential zones other than R-1, was held to be unconstitu-
tional. The court said:
Certainly trailers, house trailers and mobile homes should be sub-
ject to all of the health and safety regulations applicable to other
dwellings. The State has no right to demand more of them ...
Our Courts have said time and time again that zoning cannot be
based on aesthetic considerations.
56
50. 15 D.&C. 2d 440 (Pa. 1957).
51. The court distinguished the Gallup case and then concluded:
The word "permanently" is certainly inconsistent with the idea of a mobile
house. The very definition of a trailer, as contained in the Gallup case, namely
"a mobile house," is contradictory to the word "permanently" as used in the
Zoning Ordinance of Lower Pottsgrove Township. In the Gallup case, defendant
contended that his trailer was not a dwelling house within the meaning of the
Lower Merion Building Code. This court held that it was.
A different question presents itself in this case.
Id. at 441.
52. 165 Pa. Super. 114, 67 A.2d 288 (1949).
53. Id. at 118, 67 A.2d at 290.
54. 52 Berks Co. L.J. 2 (Pa. 1959).
55. 4 Mercer Co. L.J. 282 (Pa. 1961).
56. Id. at 284; but cf. Bilbar Construction Co. v. Easttown Township Board of
Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958).
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In the light of the above-mentioned cases it seems clear that a zoning
ordinance providing for the outright prohibition of house trailers or trailer
parks from the entire municipality is invalid. However, there is little doubt
that trailer parks may be prohibited from some (but not all) of the zoned
districts. On the authority of the Gallup case,5 7 it appears that house trailers
are to be classified as single family dwellings under zoning regulations, and
should therefore be permitted to be located on individual lots in the same
districts wherein single family dwellings are permitted. However, there is
some authority that house trailers may be excluded from certain zoned
districts if the pertinent zoning ordinance so provides (either by defining
"dwelling" so as to exclude a house trailer or by specifically prohibiting
house trailers in a particular district).
The various municipal codes set forth in detail the zoning powers of
municipalities, including the power to establish districts or zones, to impose
uniform building and use regulations for each class of buildings throughout
each district, and to impose different regulations in different districts.58
Nevertheless, it appears that few municipalities in Pennsylvania have at-
tempted to date to prescribe specifically where house trailers are or are not
permitted to be located, either by creating separate districts for house
trailers or by permitting house trailers as one among other classes or kinds
of buildings to be located only in certain districts. It would seem, how-
ever, that a strong case can be made out for doing so on the basis that
such regulations do have a reasonable and direct relation to the health,
safety, morals and general welfare of the occupants of house trailers and of
the community in general.
SOLUTIONS UNDER PRESENT LAW
The Gallup case and others following it establish that house trailers
are usually treated as single family dwellings under building and zoning
regulations. This means that the occupancy of house trailers in a munici-
pality, other than for transient or temporary purposes, is subject to the
same regulations that apply to stationary dwellings, and hence those house
trailers that cannot comply may be barred.
The Gallup case approved the standard of thirty days in twelve months
as the limit of temporary or transient use of a house trailer, after which
time the use becomes settled and subject to the building code regulations
applicable to stationary dwellings. Actually, the occupancy of house ttailers
can conceivably become detrimental to the public health, safety, morals or
57. Supra note 8.
58. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 39102-39104 (1957) (Third Class Cities); Id. §




general welfare after a few hours or a few days, depending on location of
the trailers, facilities available, and number and conduct of the occupants.
It therefore would seem proper, and in accordance with the reasoning in
the Gallup case, to apply different regulations to "transient trailers" than
those applied to "permanent trailers." Hence, upon its arrival in the munici-
pality, any occupied trailer" which did not comply with the building regu-
lations applicable to stationary dwellings would be required to be located in
a licensed trailer park. The occupancy of the trailer in such park should
be limited to a specific number of days out of any one year so as to allow
a reasonable time for temporary or transient occupancy only, after which
time the continued occupancy of such trailer in the municipality should be
permitted only if the trailer complies with building and zoning regulations
applicable to stationary dwellings. Without such time limitation, the
municipality would be discriminating by permitting permanent occupancy
in a trailer park of house trailers not in compliance with municipal regu-
lations applicable to stationary dwellings, while prohibiting permanent
occupancy of non-complying trailers elsewhere in the municipality. Numer-
ous jurisdictions have upheld the validity of time limits in trailer parks.60
It is believed that such requirements may be imposed by municipalities
under the authority set forth in the respective municipal codes (delegating
regulation of matters pertaining to the public health, safety, sanitation,
cleanliness, etc.), and that these requirements would complement building
and zoning regulations applicable to stationary dwellings. All trailer hous-
ing in the municipality, whether temporary or permanent, would then be
regulated in the interest of the public health, safety, morals and general
welfare.
The above plan makes no provision for the many house trailers that are
unable to comply with the building regulations of many municipalities and
are thereby prevented from being located permanently. Nor will it result
in all house trailers being located in trailer parks, inasmuch as some house
trailers are constructed so as to comply with building regulations applicable
to stationary dwellings. However, the plan will at least provide a method
of overall municipal regulation.
The suggestion has been made that an occupied trailer which cannot
comply with building regulations applicable to stationary dwellings might
be permitted on an individual lot if a majority of the owners of properties
59. Obviously, such regulations would not apply to those trailers only traveling
through the municipality.
60. Cady v. City of Detroit, 289 Mich. 499, 286 N.W. 805 (1939), appeal disnissed,
309 U.S. 620 (1940); Stary v. City of Brooklyn, 162 Ohio St. 120, 121 N.E.2d 11
(1954), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 923 (1955) ; Renker v. City of Brooklyn, 139 Ohio
St. 484, 40 N.E.2d 925 (1942).
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located within a limited radius of the proposed site give their approval. It
has been held, however, that when an ordinance delegates the exercise of
the police power to individuals it violates the fundamental concept of the
police power and is repugnant to the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.61 It has also been suggested that a variance be granted for the
occupancy of a trailer which cannot comply with building regulations ap-
plicable to stationary dwellings, but it is difficult to conceive how there can
be any unnecessary hardship 62 (to warrant a variance) when a person
purchases and brings into a municipality a house trailer which he knows or
should know does not comply with local building regulations.
As noted earlier, the various Pennsylvania municipalities are authorized
to enact zoning regulations including, inter alia, the imposition of building
and use regulations for each class of buildings or structures throughout each
district, with different regulations for different districts. Such regulations
must be made with reasonable consideration to the character of each district
and its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view toward con-
serving property values and encouraging the most appropriate use of land
throughout the community.
The house trailer is a structure peculiar unto itself. It is part vehicle
and part building. It is mobile but can be made stationary by removal of its
wheels, although it is not permanently affixed to the ground and can readily
be made mobile again. It is here today and gone tomorrow. It requires
utilities, services, and disposal facilities. Its location on an individual lot
in a neighborhood of detached dwellings tends to decrease surrounding real
estate values, and its appearance is not in character with the rest of the
neighborhood. For these reasons, it presents special problems of municipal
administration.
In view of all of these characteristics which distinguish a house trailer
from any other type of building, it is submitted that zoning regulations of a
municipality should provide for: (1) an exclusive residential district for
house trailers and trailer parks intended for permanent occupancy, or if
such a scheme is not feasible, then the provision for granting an exception
under proper conditions for locating house trailers or trailer parks intended
for permanent occupancy in multiple-dwelling districts; (2) the location of
trailer parks for temporary or permanent house trailer occupancy in com-
mercial districts; and (3) the prohibition of house trailers and trailer parks
from being located elsewhere.
It is clearly established that municipalities have the zoning power to
61. See Perrins Appeal, 305 Pa. 42, 156 Atl. 305 (1931).
62. See Michener Appeal, 382 Pa. 401, 115 A.2d 367 (1955); Kovacs v. Ross
Township Board of Adjustment, 173 Pa. Super. 66, 95 A.2d 344 (1952).
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exclude commercial uses from residential districts 3 and to establish different
classes of residential districts. 64 If it is proper to create different districts
and to permit only certain kinds of buildings, such as tourist, boarding,
single-detached, semi-detached, duplex, row or apartment houses to be
located in a given district, why not a classification for house trailers? House
trailers simply do not fit into any one of the above-mentioned categories.
Notwithstanding the decisions in the Stong, Reed, and Vagnoni cases up-
holding the exclusion of house trailers or trailer parks from certain districts,
if there is still some question as to the legality of establishing by zoning
regulations a separate district or classification for house trailers and trailer
parks for permanent occupancy, the case of Best v. Zoning Board of Adjust-
Ment65 seems to clear the path. In this case the court upheld the validity
of a Pittsburgh zoning ordinance involving a provision for a residence
district for single family homes, and stated:
The City of Pittsburgh has undertaken to control the density of its
population in accordance with a comprehensive plan drawn to pro-
mote the welfare of the community. It has provided residence
districts for single-family homes, for two-family dwellings and for
multiple-unit apartment houses. In this manner it has attempted,
among other things, to control the demands upon community re-
sources and to prevent an undue strain upon the facilities available
in any section of the city. Such an undertaking is neither arbitrary
nor unreasonable, and the constitutionality of single-family zoning
restrictions have been generally upheld throughout the country as
bearing a substantial relationship to the health, safety, morals and
general welfare of the community. 66
In its opinion condoning a broad application of zoning powers, the court held
that if an ordinance is substantially related to preserving or promoting the
general welfare it is not necessary that it also substantially relate to the
public health, safety or morals, and that the attractive characteristics and
the property values of a community are both proper elements of the general
welfare. 67
63. See Ward's Appeal, 289 Pa. 458, 137 Atl. 673 (1927).
64. See Best v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, supra note 41; Jennings' Appeal,
330 Pa. 154, 198 Atl. 668 (1938).
65. Best v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, supra note 41.
66. Id. at 112, 141 A.2d at 610.
67. The court concluded that:
[N]o one type of housing satisfies the varied needs of a community. Some
families prefer the conveniences of an apartment, others may like the efficient
living facilities of a modern duplex, and still others might choose the snugness
of a row house. Each type of residential development requires different supplies
of public facilities. But since the facilities available vary from one area of a
community to another the legislative body may permit only the type of housing
for which facilities in a particular district are adequate. It is therefore apparent
that the general welfare is promoted by a zoning ordinance which allocates
particular types of housing to specific residential areas.
Id. at 118, 141 A.2d at 613. For a broad application of zoning regulations under the
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Other jurisdictions have upheld the exclusion of house trailers from
certain districts.6 8 In Napierkowski v. Gloucester Tp.,69 the Supreme Court
of New Jersey upheld zoning and trailer camp ordinances prohibiting house
trailers as residences except in licensed trailer parks as a reasonable exercise
of the police power, even though there were no trailer parks then located
within the municipality. The court stated:
In our view prohibition of trailers as residences at other than duly
licensed trailer parks or camps is a reasonable exercise of the police
power, designed to promote the general health, safety and welfare
of the municipality by assuring that adequate provisions are made
for drainage, sewerage facilities, water and lighting of trailers and




Although the above-mentioned zoning plan would solve the problem of
the location of house trailers, it would not meet the problem of conformance
to building regulations. House trailers cannot comply with many of the
standard building code requirements applicable to stationary buildings. The
usual inspections made by building, electrical and plumbing inspectors are
impossible in the case of house trailers, because most of their structural
materials and electrical, heating and plumbing installations are concealed.
It is conceivable that certain house trailer structural materials of small size
and weight are nevertheless as strong and durable as materials of larger size
and weight used in stationary dwellings, and that a specially ventilated small
room in a house trailer is as healthful for habitation as a larger room in a
permanent house. Furthermore, a compact plumbing facility in a house
trailer may be as efficient and sanitary as the plumbing fixtures installed in
a stationary building on the site. Different regulations might therefore be
justified on the basis of a reasonable classification separating trailers from
stationary dwellings. However, as a practical matter, building regulations
especially drawn for and applicable only to house trailers must be directed
to the time of manufacture and assembly of the house trailer rather than to
the time of its arrival in the municipality.
Therefore it is suggested that the Commonwealth pre-empt the area of
regulation of the design of house trailers manufactured for permanent occu-
police power, see Bilbar Construction Co. v. Easttown Township Board of Adjustment,
supra note 56.
68. See Connor v. West Bloomfield Township, 207 F.2d 482 (6th Cir. 1958).
69. 29 N.J. 481, 150 A.2d 481 (1959).
70. Id. at -, 150 A.2d at 489. The following was given as a general basis for the
court's decision: "Two of the basic concepts of sound zoning, encouragement of the most
appropriate use of land and conservation of property values, may be undermined by the
indiscriminate location of trailers within a municipality." Id. at -, 150 A.2d at 487.
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pancy, by establishing minimum standards and specifications for size, struc-
ture, and plumbing, heating, ventilating and electrical equipment. When a
house trailer model manufactured in Pennsylvania or shipped to a Pennsyl-
vania dealer had been approved as meeting Commonwealth standards and
specifications, a certificate could then be issued by the Commonwealth qualify-
ing such house trailer for permanent dwelling purposes in Pennsylvania with-
out the necessity of compliance with municipal building regulations applicable
to size, construction and equipment. However, municipal building regulations
would still apply to any work performed on the site, such as connections to
utilities, sewage disposal, repairs and maintenance. Zoning regulations would
also apply to the location of the house trailer. Similar design regulations,
adopted by the State of California in cooperation with the trade associations
of mobilehome manufacturers, is embodied in a state code entitled "Rules and
Regulations for Plumbing, Heating and Electrical Equipment in Trailer
Coaches. ' 7 1 Under its provisions, an approval insignia is issued when a
trailer coach has been approved as meeting state requirements. The Code
covers the sale of new and used house trailers built after September 1, 1958.
Under such regulatory provisions, house trailers certified by the Com-
monwealth would be admitted into a municipality for permanent occupancy
without the necessity of complying with certain municipal building regu-
lations, and house trailers and trailer parks would be located only in certain
designated districts of the municipality in accordance with the zoning regu-
lations suggested above. House trailers not certified by the Commonwealth
would be permitted to be located only in a trailer park for transients for a
limited time. It is submitted that such an overall plan would make possible
comprehensive municipal regulation of house trailers in the best interest of
the house trailer occupants and the community in general.
71. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 18371 (Supp. 1961).
